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The Pigouvian Tax Rule in the Presence of an Eco-Industry 
 
Summary 
Pollution abatement goods and services are now largely being delivered by a specialized 
“eco-industry.” This note reconsiders Pigouvian taxes in this context. We find that the 
optimal emission tax will depart from the marginal social cost of pollution according to 
the polluters’ and the environment firms’ relative market power. 
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In his classical analysis of market failure, Arthur Pigou (1920) showed that the negative
externalities caused by pollution would be internalized by the market if polluters paid a
tax equal to the marginal social cost of polluting emissions. This proposition, derived
under the assumption of perfect competition, was later amended by Buchanan (1969)
and Barnett (1980): when the polluting industry is imperfectly competitive, an emission
tax should be set lower than the marginal social cost of pollution, because it trades oﬀ
the desire to provide incentives for abatement and the necessity to prevent a greater
contraction of output. Several authors (see, for example, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas,
1995; Long and Soubeyran, 1999; Morgenstern, 1995; and Smith, 1992) have now explored,
qualiﬁed and reﬁned the latter conclusion under more speciﬁc industry structures.
All these studies, however, (in fact, all environmental economics so far) postulate that
a polluting ﬁrm possesses its own internal abatement technology. But nowadays, abate-
ment goods and services are largely procured from specialized environment ﬁrms, and
this so-called “eco-industry” looks rather concentrated (see Barton, 1997; Davies, 2002;
the European Commission, 1999; Karliner, 1999; the OECD, 1996; and the World Trade
Organization, 1998). In a recent paper that ﬁrst acknowledges this situation, David and
Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) amended Pigou’s basic framework and found that an optimal
emission tax should now be set higher than the marginal social cost of pollution. In-
tuitively, imperfect competition between environment ﬁrms results in abatement prices
larger than the marginal cost of abatement; emission taxes must then be raised in order
2to make polluters reduce their emissions suﬃciently. This note examines whether and to
what extent a similar conclusion holds in the Buchanan-Barnett context. The upshot is
that the optimal emission tax needs in general to adjust to the polluters’ and the abate-
ment suppliers’ relative market power. It may happen, for instance, that the distortions
respectively present on the product and the abatement markets oﬀset each other to the
p o i n tt h a tt h eo p t i m a le m i s s i o nt a xt u r n so u tt ob et h eo n ep r e s c r i b e di n i t i a l l yb yP i g o u .
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives and
discusses our results. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. The model
First consider n identical ﬁrms competing àl aCournot. Each ﬁrm i produces a
quantity xi of a ﬁnal good at a cost C(xi), where the latter function is twice diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing and convex. Consumers’ preferences for this ﬁnal good are captured
by the inverse demand function p(X), X =
Pn
i=1 xi , p0(X) < 0.E a c hﬁrm also generates
polluting emissions according to an emission function e(xi,a i),w h e r eai represents ﬁrm
i’s abatement eﬀort. We assume that e(xi,a i)=w(xi) − ai , w0(xi) > 0 and w00(xi) ≥ 0.1
Now, let the abatement goods and services be supplied by a Cournot oligopoly com-
prising m similar environment ﬁrms. Firm j’s cost of delivering an amount aj of such
1Our qualitative results remain valid without assuming an additively separable emission function. This
assumption greatly simpliﬁes the upcoming computations, however. It has been used in several previous
works (Barnett, 1980; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995; Farzin and Kort, 2001; David and Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2005). It also ﬁts end-of-pipe abatement activities, such as solid waste management, waste
water treatment, air pollution control, contaminated soil and groundwater remediation, which currently
draw (by far) the largest share of abatement expenses (European Commission, 1999).
3g o o d sa n ds e r v i c e si sg i v e nb yG(aj),w i t hG0 and G00 strictly positive. When the mar-
ket for abatement is characterized by the inverse demand function q(A), A =
Pm
j=1 aj,
q0(A) < 0, each environment ﬁrm oﬀers a quantity aj that maximizes the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
Πj(aj)=q(A)aj − G(aj) .
Satisfying simultaneously the (necessary and suﬃcient) ﬁrst-order conditions
q(A)=G
0(aj) − q
0(A)aj , j =1 ,...,m (1)
then yields a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the eco-industry.
From now on, we shall focus on symmetric equilibria, so a representative polluter i’s
production and abatement are respectively given by x = X
n and ai = A
n, and a represen-
tative environment ﬁrm j’s delivered quantity of abatement is aj = A
m.
3. Optimal emission taxes
Suppose that each unit of pollution bears a positive social cost ν.Ab e n e v o l e n ta n d
informed regulator may now want to impose a tax t on polluting emissions. Ignoring












4where by symmetry xt = Xt
n , at
i = At
n ,a n dat
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m. After we drop the superscript t
(remembering throughout that abatement and output levels depend on the tax t), the
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A representative polluter will react to this tax by maximizing the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
Πi(x,ai)=p(X)x − C(x) − q(A)ai − te(x,ai) .






0(A)ai + t.( 4 )




tively negative and positive, meaning that a larger tax on polluting emissions generates
less production of the ﬁnal good and greater abatement eﬀorts.
Substituting (1), (3) and (4) into expression (2) now yields the general formula for the
Pigouvian tax rule:

















N o t et h a tt h ed e n o m i n a t o ro nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei sn e g a t i v e .
5Were the eco-industry perfectly competitive, which amounts here to letting m →∞ ,
the regulator should set t = υ if n also tends to inﬁnity (as Pigou (1920) ﬁrst proposed)
or t<υ if n is ﬁnite (in agreement with Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980), but with
an additional downward adjustment due to the term −A
nq0(A)
dai
dt which expresses the
polluting ﬁrms’ oligopsony in the abatement market).
Let now m<∞, so the eco-industry is imperfectly competitive. By (1), the price




plus am a r k u p A
mq0(A).
This markup further dissuades polluters from investing in abatement. To counter this,
the regulator has to play tougher on polluting emissions.2 Indeed, when n is inﬁnite
(so polluters are price-takers), formula (5) coincides with the one obtained by David
and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) and we have that t>v .W i t h n also ﬁnite, however, the
regulator must deal with the exercise of market power by polluting ﬁrms in the ﬁnal
good market, which lowers consumer surplus, together with the simultaneous presence of
an oligopsony and an oligopoly in the abatement market, which both hinder pollution
reduction. After some algebra, the numerator on the right-hand-side of (5) indicates that
>>

















2In practice, environmental policy has to also cope with the possibility of exit from the polluting
sector and entry in the eco-industry, and take into account the redistribution of revenues from polluting
to environment ﬁrms. A careful treatment of these issues is obviously beyond the scope of this note.
6where LECO and LPROD are the Lerner indices associated with the eco-industry and
the ﬁnal good market respectively.3 As the environment ﬁrms’ market power matters
relatively more (less), so n−m
n or
LECO
LPROD increases (decreases), the regulator would now
impose a higher (lower) tax on emissions. This tax will approximate Pigou (1920)’s














This paper showed that taxes targetting polluting emissions must adjust to the relative
market power of environment ﬁrms (on the abatement market) and polluters (on both the
ﬁnal good and the abatement markets). All things equal, a relatively more concentrated
and powerful eco-industry warrants higher emission taxes.
The impact of more complex and realistic industry structures - with endogenous entry
and exit, or privately informed and heterogeneous environment ﬁrms, for example - on
Pigouvian taxes and environmental regulation in general remains to be explored. Pursuing
this path, henceforth investigating the vertical relationships and actual division of labor
between polluting ﬁrms and their abatement suppliers, will certainly shed light on the
3Deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s price and its marginal cost, divided by the ﬁrm’s price, the








n|ε|,w h e r eε and η are the price-elasticities of demand for the ﬁnal
good and for the abatement goods and services respectively.
7current black box of abatement costs, for the greater eﬀectiveness of environmental policy.
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